My research focuses extremism in democracies. I describe my research on this topic in the paragraphs that follow. These projects use a variety of methods, including experiments, surveys, text-as-data, and other techniques. I consider the nature of extremism and factors that promote and discourage extremism.

Please contact me for materials relating to any of these papers or projects.


“Should You Stay away from Strangers? Conducting Experiments on the Political Consequences of Intergroup Contact” – Forthcoming at Cambridge University Press.

Many theories of democracy suggest that harmonious relationship between groups are critical for democratic societies, and intergroup contact presents an appealing way to encourage these relationships. However, what types of contact encourage harmony between groups? In this Element, I review existing studies of contact, propose a framework for productively studying the political consequences of intergroup contact through experiments, and discuss four experiments following these recommendations. These studies focus on the consequences of the difficulty of communicating in the contact experience and are conducted on different samples and contexts to present a broad picture of the role of different forms of contact. I find that easy-to-understand forms of contact do not promote more political support for racial and ethnic outgroups and can, in some conditions, provoke a backlash consistent with theories about social identity and group threat. I conclude by discussing the implications of the substantive findings and the proposed framework for studying contact.

Busby, Ethan, Kirk A. Hawkins, and Joshua R. Gubler. 2019. “Framing and Blame Attribution in Populist Rhetoric“. Journal of Politics 81(2):616-630. Replication data

Scholars have long known that the rhetoric of populist politicians is an important part of their appeal; however, less is known about how that rhetoric operates. Drawing on data from two large experiments conducted with American adults, we show that survey questions encouraging individuals to consider political problems within a dispositional blame frame activates latent populist attitudes, while an encouragement to consider these same problems in a situational blame frame does not. In our second experiment, we connect this framing change to voting intentions and find that subjects exposed to dispositional frames are more likely to express support for Donald Trump and less likely to express support for Hillary Clinton than subjects exposed to situational frames. Importantly, the impact of framing is contingent on pre-existing populist attitudes; subjects with moderate levels of populist attitudes are much more likely to demonstrate an increase in expressed populism and support for Trump.

Rothschild, Jacob, Adam Howat, Richard Shafranek, and Ethan Busby. 2019. “Pigeonholing Partisans: Mass Stereotypes of Party Supporters and Partisan Polarization“. Political Behavior 41(2): 423-443. Replication data.

What comes to mind when people think about rank-and-file party supporters? What stereotypes do people hold regarding ordinary partisans, and are these views politically consequential? We utilize open-ended survey items and structural topic modeling to document stereotypes about rank-and-file Democrats and Republicans. Many subjects report stereotypes consistent with the parties’ actual composition, but individual differences in political knowledge, interest, and partisan affiliation predict their specific content. Respondents varied in their tendency to characterize partisans in terms of group memberships, issue preferences, or individual traits, lending support to both ideological and identity-based conceptions of partisanship. Most importantly, we show that partisan stereotype content is politically significant: individuals who think of partisans in a predominantly trait-based manner – that is, in a way consistent with partisanship as a social identity – display dramatically higher levels of both affective and ideological polarization.

Busby, Ethan and James N. Druckman. 2018. Football and Public Opinion: A Partial Replication and Extension“. Journal of Experimental Political Science 5(1):4-10. Replication data.

Do events irrelevant to politics, such as the weather and sporting events, affect political opinions? A growing experimental literature suggests that such events can matter. However, extant experimental evidence may over-state irrelevant event effects; this could occur if these studies happen to focus on particular scenarios where irrelevant event effects are likely to occur. One way to address this possibility is through replication, which is what we do. Specifically, we replicate an experimental study that showed the outcome of a college football game can influence presidential approval. Our results partially replicate the previous study and suggest the impact is constrained to a limited set of outcome variables. The findings accentuate the need for scholars to identify the conditions under which irrelevant effects occur. While the effects clearly can occur, there relevance to politics remains unclear.

Busby, Ethan, James N. Druckman, and Alexandria Fredendall. 2017. “The Political Relevance of Irrelevant Events”. Journal of Politics 79(1): 346-350. Replication Data

Do events irrelevant to politics affect citizens’ political opinions? A growing literature suggests that such events (e.g., athletic competitions, shark attacks) do in fact shape political preferences. We present an experiment that largely replicates a widely noted irrelevant event effect. Specifically, we find that the outcome of a sporting event (i.e., a football game) affects presidential approval and likely does so by affecting individuals’ moods. We also show that the effect is short-lived.

Busby, Ethan, D.J. Flynn, and James N. Druckman. 2018. “Studying Framing Effects on Political Preferences: Existing Research and Lingering Questions.” Doing News Framing Analysis II (Paul D’Angelo, ed.). New York: Routledge, p. 27-50.

This chapter reviews the state of framing research, noting strengths, weaknesses, and unexplored areas of this literature.

Hawkins, Kirk, A., Levente Littvay, and Ethan C. Busby. 2019. “The Causes of Populism: Explaining the Victory” Contemporary US Populism in a Comparative Perspective (Kirk A. Hawkins and Levente Littvay). New York: Cambridge University Press.

This chapter, as part of a larger book on populism in the United States from a comparative perspective, explores the insights research on populism brings to understanding the 2016 elections and the victory of Donald Trump. The chapter relies on survey data from the United States in 2008, 2012, and 2016 to explore this topic. We show that populist attitudes is a key driver of support for populist movements and candidates, even controlling for authoritarianism, immigration attitudes, and racial resentment.

Busby, Ethan C., David Doyle, Kirk A. Hawkins, Nina Wiesehomeier. 2018. “Activating populist attitudes: the role of corruption.” The ideational approach to populism: Concept, theory, and method.  (Kirk A. Hawkins, Ryan Carlin, Levi Littvay, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, eds.). New York: Routledge.

Recent advances in the study of populism, particularly at the individual-level, have conclusively demonstrated the importance of elite framing for activating and directing latent populist attitudes among the electorate. Ideational work in this vein however, has yet to explain exactly how policy failure and the political context also incentivize populist behavior. We expect that policy failures that result from intentional misconduct are more likely to trigger a populist response than those resulting from negligence or external causes, and that such a response is likely to be greater when this type of corruption is endemic. We tested these theoretical expectations in two laboratory-based experiments: one on a student sample at Northwestern University in the United States, the other on a mixed student/resident sample at Oxford University in the United Kingdom.

Under review:

“Dangerous or Just Differences of Opinion? Distinguishing between different types of extremism” Article under review.

Extremism is a challenging problem, and many democratic theorists have noted how extremists erode democratic institutions and resort to violence. However, at a conceptual level, extremism is complex, and its empirical relationship to these negative ideas remains unknown. To resolve these conceptual and measurement issues, I use the 2016 ANES to examine the convergence of the different kinds of extremists in the United States. I then connect different combinations of extremism to ideas democratic theorists warn against and the defining problems of extremism – a tendency to resort to violent and illegal methods to accomplish their goals. These analyses suggest various forms of extremism exist and that some combinations have stronger anti-democratic tendencies than others. More specifically, the extremists who present the largest challenge to democracy are those who display multiple forms of extremism simultaneously – it is these compound extremists who endorse violence as a means to political ends. I conclude with a discussion of the normative implications of this work and how it informs attempts to address extremism.

“Why Can’t You All Just Get Along?: Effects of Political Conflict among Outgroups”—with Jacob Rothschild. Article under review.

Politics often involves complex combinations of groups aligning on various sides. How do these relationships affect citizens’ opinions?  Particularly, what happens when one observes groups of which they are not members engaging in conflict or coalition? We address these questions by drawing on balance theory. We hypothesize that individuals react to conflict between two liked outgroups by adopting more negative attitudes towards the less-liked group. We test our predictions with two survey experiments – one conducted on a convenience sample and one with a nationally representative sample. Study 1 indicates that when a liked group and a disliked group clash, individuals do not change their evaluations of these outgroups – their prior opinions persist. By contrast, when political conflict involves two liked outgroups, individuals adopt more negative affect for and express lower solidarity with the lesser-liked group. We confirm these findings with Study 2, where we observe similar behavior. We also discuss the limits of these effects, which do not extend to evaluations of specific candidates or policies. Our results suggest that intergroup conflict can do more than just shift attitudes among those involved; it also impacts third-party observers and potential allies.

Ongoing research:

“The Partisan Next Door: Stereotypes of Party Supporters and Consequences for Polarization in America”—Ongoing book project with Adam Howat, Jacob Rothschild, and Richard Shafranek.

Partisan polarization in the United States has, in recent decades, risen to near-unprecedented levels. Supporters of the Democratic and Republican Parties increasingly express a deep, fundamental dislike of opposing partisans, regardless of whether they disagree on policy. This phenomenon, known as affective polarization (Iyengar et al. 2019), arises from partisanship’s growing role as a social identity in its own right, comparable in its nature and consequences to race, religion, or gender (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Greene 1999, 2004). In other words, partisanship shapes not only people’s expressly political orientations and behaviors; it also constitutes, for many individuals, a key component of their self-concepts—and, by extension, how they socially categorize others.

In the context of such polarization, how, precisely, do everyday party supporters think about each other? What images come to mind when ordinary people think of these ordinary partisans? Moreover, what are the consequences for polarization of holding different images of mass partisans in one’s head? Using both observational and experimental data, our book provides answers to these questions.

Our findings show that a large portion of the American public hold clear, sensible ideas about party supporters. These stereotypes tend to cohere around traits, political issues, and groups—in line with the identity, instrumental, and group views of partisanship, respectively. Moreover, the specific images people hold of run-of-the-mill partisans—and not merely the affective evaluations attached to those images—matter when it comes to relations between the parties and partisans. Thinking of everyday partisans in terms of what they “are like,” particularly when it comes to individual character traits, tends to accentuate polarization of all kinds. However, if people can be induced to take a more instrumental view, focusing on the different issues that the parties consider important, this may help to reduce partisan animus, facilitate political compromise, and promote social harmony between supporters of the two parties.

“Judgments of Extremism in the American Public and Elected Officials” Working Paper. Draft

Democracies around the world face extreme threats like the erosion of democratic norms, repression of dissent, and outbursts of political violence. The ability of democracies to defend themselves from these problems depends on how much citizens and political actors recognize such threats as extreme and penalize these kinds of extremism. What, then, do Americans citizens and elected officials recognize as extreme? What political penalties are associated with extremism? In this paper, I explore the defenses that both ordinary American citizens and elected officials provide against extremism in its various forms. Using data from two conjoint experiments, I find that the public can provide some protection from extremism, especially responding to political violence and incivility. Elected officials are even more adept at recognizing extremism and show more potential for protecting democracy from problematic types of extremists. Encouragingly, there appears to be a shared understanding of problematic forms of extremism and corresponding penalty; these results do not depend on individuals’ partisanship, similarity with the extremist, or political interest. However, many kinds of extremism go unacknowledged and even the most challenging forms of extremism are far from unanimously rejected.

“When it Pays to Be in Denial: The Role of Deniability in Racial Messaging”—with Andrew I. Thompson. Working Paper. Draft

American politicians frequently evoke race in their messages to the public. This continues to be true even when politicians and candidates often pay a price for racial rhetoric and messaging. We propose that elites continue to use messages about race because they can mitigate the costs of doing so with another rhetorical tool – a racial denial, or denial of racial intent or motivation. Integrating literatures on elite rhetorical tactics and counterframing, we predict that when denials and implicit racial messages are combined, elites can mobilize the support for racially resentful Whites without alienating others. Using a survey experiment conducted with White Americans (N=1,800), we find that racial denials operate as we expect, and we find no evidence that politicians receive penalties for these racial denials. With a second survey experiment conducted in a very different racial environment, we compare racial denials to other rhetorical tactics and consider how Nonwhite Americans respond to these strategies. We discuss these results for the larger literature on racial messaging and elite manipulation more generally.

“Causation or correlation? Populism and radicalism”—with Joshua R. Gubler and Kirk A. Hawkins. Working Paper

Concern about the consequences of populism is widespread. In particular, many worry that populism prompts radicalism on other political and social attitudes, such as racism and political intolerance. Some existing studies look at the correlations between populism and these other attitudes, but the causal link between populism and these beliefs remains unexplored. We fill this space through a re-analysis of a survey experiment conducted in the United States in 2016 (N=840). We find that exposure to populist frames not only increases populism (the original findings), but also generates attitudes traditionally associated with the radical right: ethnocentrism and racial resentment. Those who are generally viewed as more impartial and least polarized—political moderates—appear to be the most reactive to populist perspectives. We end with a discussion of the import of these results for the study of populism and radicalism more generally.

“Self-Image Maintenance Motivation and Intergroup Conflict”—with Joshua R. Gubler, Christopher F. Karpowitz, and Haley Peterson. Working Paper.

An increasing number of social and political psychologists have begun to explore the relationships between psychological motivations and attitudes and behavior (Molden 2012, Sherman 2013, Lodge and Taber 2013).  This requires researchers to identify measures of the process motivating attitude formation, rather than simply using measures one of attitude to predict another.  In this paper, we use this approach and present a measure for a motivation not commonly discussed in political psychology—self-image maintenance motivation (SIMM).  We show that like SDO and authoritarianism, it negatively correlates with support for Muslim immigrants, refugees, and policies targeting these groups. The measure, adapted from research on conflict in romantic relationships, lacks political, ideological, or identity-based content.  Rather, it measures individuals’ motivations to protect a positive sense of self. We adapt self-affirmation theory to explain why we expect this correlation, and the ramifications of these results for the study of intergroup cooperation and conflict. Our data come from two separate, large, nationally diverse studies (n = 4000; n = 8000) conducted during the first half of 2018 in the United Kingdom; results are comparable across both studies.  We use factor analysis to establish that SIMM is separate from SDO and authoritarianism.

“Speaking and Supporting Populism: A Large-scale Survey Experiment on Dispositional Blame, Expressions of Populism, and Cooperation”—with Ryan E. Carlin, Kirk A. Hawkins, and Levente Littvay. Working Paper.

What prompts citizens to express populism and collaborate with other populists? Building on existing studies on the psychology of populism, we describe a theory of populist framing, expression, and cooperation. This theory predicts that populist frames encouraging dispositional blame should evoke more populist expressions among the public. Further, these frames and this rhetoric should also translate into an increased willingness to collaborate with other populist individuals. We also incorporate theories about the characteristics of the respondent (notably ideology and pre-existing populist attitudes) and the attributes of other populists (gender and skin-tone) as a part of our expectations. We test these theories with a large, randomized experiment hosted via The Guardian as part of their New Populism Project, where we randomly assign subjects to different types of populist frames and observe the expressive and behavioral consequences. With a sample size of approximately 30,000, we consider the robustness of these effects in different political environments and based on subjects’ demographic characteristics. We conclude that blame-based rhetoric has important consequences for the populism people speak as well as the support they extend to others. We discuss the implications of this work for populism broadly, framing, experimental research, and the replication of existing studies on the psychology of populism.

Anxiety Problems or Anger Issues? A Multi-country Experiment on the Emotional Underpinnings of Populism—with David Doyle, Kirk A. Hawkins, and Nina Wiesehomeier. Working Paper.

Scholars have started to apply theories of affective cognition to the study of populism, seeking to understand whether efforts to prime negative or positive affect can independently trigger or suppress populist attitudes. However, much remains unknown about what emotions are associated with populism, let alone whether they serve as independent triggers. Recent observational research suggests that populism primarily works through anger (Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza 2017), while other experimental research claims that it involves fear (Hameleers, Bos, and de Vreese 2016). We suggest that much of the confusion arises because populism associates itself with different substantive issues, and that these issues themselves evoke emotions that can be hard to disentangle from the impact of populist ideas. To test this explanation and provide a clearer understanding of the emotional underpinnings of populism, we perform a series of experiments that activate populist attitudes in stages. Each experiment, conducted on online Netquest samples (N=1200) in the United States, Spain, and the United Kingdom, first presents subjects with one of a short series of issues devoid of populist rhetoric (treatment 1), then exposes subjects to a populist framing of that issue (treatment 2). For each group, we record self-reported emotional states post-treatment, allowing us to tease apart which emotions are associated with each issue and populism. Experimental results suggest that different issues evoke different emotions, but that populist rhetoric adds a layer of anger. We end with a discussion of the implications of this work for the study of populism and affective politics more generally.

“The socialization of economic inequality”—with Andrea K. Busby. Ongoing project